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ABSTRACT 
This  paper  analyzes  the  impact  of differential  tariffs  on  consumption  and  investment  in 
a specific  factors  model  of a small  open  economy  in  which  capital  is  accumulated  over  time. 
Particular  attention  is devoted  to  the  welfare  aspects,  highlighting  the  cost  of the  intertemporal 
distortions  produced  by  protective  trade  policies.  Several  specific  welfare  propositions  are 
obtained.  Fist,  tariff  protection  is  shown  to  create  short-run  beneftts  but  long-run  costs  in 
welfare.  Secondly,  the  second-best  policy  for  the  two  tariffs  is  characterized.  Finally,  several 
propositions  summarizing  the  implications  of our  analysis  for  tariff  reform  are  derived. 
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and  NBER I.  INTRODUCTION 
Theoretical  work  on  capital  accumulation  under  protective  trade  regimes  has  produced 
a substantial  literature  on  the  subject  of  “immiserizing  growth.”  Much  of  the  motivation  for 
this  literature  derives  from  the  experience  of  developing  countries,  since  as  Jol-umm  (1967. 
p.  152)  noted,  the  “possibility  of  income-reducing  growth  is relevant  to  the  fact  that 
countries  industrializing  by  means of  protectionist  and  import-substituting  policies  are 
frequently  dissatisfied  with  the  results.”  Most  theoretical  analyses of immiserizing  growth, 
including  Bhagwati  (1973),  Brecher  and  Diaz-Alejandro  (1977),  and  Casas (1985),  have 
stressed  the  ambiguous  welfare  consequences of  an  ezogenous capital  inflow  (such  as an 
unrequited  transfer)  in  the  presence of  a tariff.  In  an  important  recent  article,  Neary  and 
Ruane  (1988)  have  analyzed  the  full  equilibrium  effects  of  an  endogenous tariff-induced 
capital  inflow.  In  so doing,  they  have  provided  an  important  clarification  to  the  literature 
on  immiserizing  growth  by  showing  that,  unlike  an  exogenous  capital  inflow,  a  tariff- 
induced  capital  inflow  will  never  be welfare  improving  in  a standard  convex  economy. 
Despite  the  use of  the  term  “immiserizing  growth,”  existing  studies  have  conducted 
their  analyses using  a static  framework,  in  which  all  capital  accumulation  is assumed to 
occur  instantaneously.  In  this paper  we extend  the  welfare  analysis of  immiserizing  growth 
to  a dynamic  setting  in  which  capital  accumulates  gradually  over  time.  Like  Neary  and 
Ruane,  we are concerned  with  the  full  equilibrium  effects  of  tariff-induced  capital  inflows, 
and  we discuss how  the  welfare  consequences of  tariff  policy  can  be  captured  by  a welfare 
integral  over  the  time  path  of  discounted  instantaneous  utility.  We  are  unaware  of  any 
previous  such  dynamic  welfare  analysis  of  tariff  protection. 
The  model  we have  chosen to  analyze  is the  Jones (1971)-Samuelson  (1971)  specific 
factors  model  of  trade  in  which  the  import-competing  sector  uses capital  and  the  export 
sector  uses land,  both  in  conjunction  with  intersectorally  mobile  labor.  This  choice  of 
production  structure  orients  the  analysis  toward  developing  countries  and,  for  a  similar 
reason,  was the  structure  chosen by  Dixit  and  Grossman  (1982)  to  model  the  effect  of  a 
1 uniform  tariff  in  a  model  with  multistage  production,  and  by  Brecher  and  Findlay  (1983) 
to  examine  immiserizing  growth  in  the  presence  of  a  tax  on  foreign  investment. 
The  model  includes  three  elements  of  the  production  technology  that  allow  us  to 
extend  the  welfare  analysis  of  tariffs  within  a  specific  factors  setting  in  several  new  direc- 
tions.  The  first  element  is  the  specification  of  differential  tariffs  on  the  import-competing 
sector  and  on  the  imported  investment  good.  Although  previous  welfare  analyses  of  pro- 
tection  have  focused  on  the  case  of  uniform  tariffs,  differential  tariffs  on  capital  goods  and 
consumer  goods  are  the  rule,  rather  than  the  exception,  in  developing  countries.’ 
The  second  element  of  the  model’s  technology  is  the  specification  of  an  endogenous 
labor  supply.  Although  trade  models  typically  assume  an  exogenously-given  labor  supply, 
we  find  that  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply  is  an  important  determinant  of  the  welfare  cost 
of  tariffs.  1Ve  also  find  that  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply  is  an  important  determinant  of 
the  initial  employment  effects  of  a  tariff  and  that  these  initial  effects  may  be  reversed  over 
time  as  the  capital  stock  adjusts. 
The  third  element  of  the  model’s  technology  is  an  adjustment  cost  function  that  is 
increasing  in  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation.  The  use  of  such  a function  has  been  made  in 
the  microeconomics  literature  beginning  with  the  work  of  Lucas  (1967),  Treadway  (1969) 
and  others  in  the  196Os,  and  has  been  incorporated  into  trade  models  beginning  with  the 
work  of  Frenkel  and  Rodriguez.  (1975).  We  show  that  one  determinant  of  the  welfare  cost 
of  protection  is  the  convexity  of  the  adjustment  cost  function,  since  the  speed  (and,  hence, 
the  welfare  cost)  of  the  economy’s  adjustment  to  changes  in  tariffs  depends  in  part  on  the 
marginal  insta.IIation  costs  of  new  capital. 
We  provide  a  positive  analysis  of  the  dynamic  adjustment  of  an  economy  to  tariff 
changes  and  derive  several  welfare  results.  Our  first  result  is  that,  starting  from  free  trade,  a 
uniform  tariff  increase  distorts  the  time  path  of  instantaneous  utility,  so  that  instantaneous 
utility  is  initially  raised  above  the  free-trade  level  before  declining  to  a long-run  level  that 
is  lower  than  the  initial  free-trade  level.  That  is  to  say,  tariff  protection  creates  short-run 
2 benefits  and  long-run  costs  in  welfare  terms.  Second,  we  show  that  a second-best  optimal 
investment  tariff  will  exceed  the  consumption  tariff,  both  because  investment  goods  in  the 
model  are  general  equilibrium  substitutes  for  the  exportable  good  and  because  the  tariff 
on  the  investment  good  helps  to  correct  factor  price  distortions  caused  by  the  consumption 
tsxiff. 
The  next  two  results  extend  the  literature  on  the  welfare  gains  associated  with  the 
concertina  and  radial  tariff  reduction  methods  of  piecemeal  tariff  reform.  The  welfare 
calculations  carried  out  for  these  methods  include,  in  addition  to  the  usual  static  gains, 
an  intertemporal  welfare  term.  Our  fifth  result  concerns  the  welfare-improving  effects 
of  a  reduction  in  the  consumption  tariff  in  conjunction  with  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on 
the  investment  good,  a  method  of  piecemeal  tariff  reform  that  we  label  the  “two-handed 
concertina”  method.  We  view  this  last  result  as  an  important  one,  since  several  well-known 
trade  liberalizations  began  by  raising  tariff  rates  on  investment  goods  at  the  same  time 
that  tariff  rates  on  consumption  goods  were  lowered.’ 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  SectiornII  and  III  lay  out  the  analytical  framework. 
This  framework  is  the  inflnitely-lived  utility-maximizing  representative  agent  model  that 
has  been  recently  employed  to  analyze  a  variety  of  macroeconomic  disturbances  in  open 
economies.’  Section  IV  describes  some  of  the  macroeconomic  adjustments  to  tariff  changes, 
while  Section  V  conducts  the  welfare  analysis  of  tariff  changes.  Both  the  short-run  and 
long-run  welfare  implications  are discussed.  Section  VI  discusses  some welfare  propositions 
relevant  to  issues pertaining  to  tariff  reform.  Section  VII  concludes,  while  much  of  the 
technical  detail  is relegated  to  the  Appendix. 
II.  THE  ANALYTICAL  FRAMEWORK 
The  economy  we consider  is inhabited  by  a single,  intlnitely-lived  representative  agent 
who  rents  out  an  inelastic  quantity  of  land  (2’)  at  its  competitive  rental  rate,  accumulates 
capital  (K)  for  rental  at  its  competitively  determined  rental  rate,  and  supplies  labor  at 
3 the  competitive  wage.4  The  agent  produces  an  import-competing  good  (taken  to  be  the 
numeraire)  using  the  stock  of  capital  and  quantity  of  labor  L”‘,  by  means  of  a  standard 
neoclassical  production  function  F(K,  L”).  The  agent  also  produces  an  exportable  good 
using  the  endowment  of  land  and  the  quantity  of  labor  L”,  by  means  of  a second  standard 
neoclassical  production  function  G(T,  L’).  The  price  of  the  exportable  good  is  normalized 
to  equal  the  price  of  the  import-competing  good.  Capital  is  therefore  specific  to  the 
production  of  the  import-competing  good  and  land  to  the  production  of  the  export  good. 
The  capital  stock  depreciates  at  the  constant  rate  6.  Capital  goods  are  imported  and 
unlike  the  import-competing  final  good,  are  not  produced  domestically.  Expenditure  on  a 
given  increase  in  the  capital  stock  involves  adjustment  costs  which  we  incorporate  in  the 
function 
where  the  gross  investment  of  I  units  of  capital  requires  the  use  of  6(1,  If)  units  of  output. 
The  function  O(I,K)  is  specified  to  be  a  non-negative,  linearly  homogeneous,  convex 
function  of  the  rate  of  gross  investment  and  capital  stock.s  The  homogeneity  property 
of  the  installation  cost  function  ensures  that  the  market  value  of  the  capital  stock  is 
invariant  with  respect  to  changes  in  the  scale  of  the  economy.6  For  analytical  convenience 
we  assume  4(6K,K)  =  O,q5r(bK,K)  =  0, so  that  adjustment  costs  are  minimized  (zero) 
in  the  neighborhood  of  steady-state  equilibrium  (where  I  =  6K).' 
The  importable  consumption  good  is  subject  to  a  tariff  (T’)  levied  by  the  govern- 
ment.  Imports  of  the  investment  good  are  subject  to  a  separate  tariff  (ri).  Revenues 
from  both  tariffs  are  distributed  as  lump  sum  transfers  (2)  by  the  government  back  to  the 
representative  agent. 
The  agent  also  accumulates  net  foreign  bonds  (b)  that  pay  an  exogenously-given  world 
interest  rate  (r).  Equation  (1)  describes  the  agent’s  instantaneous  budget  constraint 
4 i,=(1+r~)F(li,Lm)+C(T,Lf)+rb-(1+r~)C~-C=-(1+T’)~(z,K)+r  (1) 
where  Cm  and  C’  are  the  agent’s  consumption  of  the  importable  and  exportable  goods. 
Because  of  the  depreciating  capital  stock,  the  agent  also  faces  the  standard  capital  accu- 
mulation  constraint 
k=I-6K.  (2) 
Finally,  the  agent  must  allocate  one  unit  of  time  between  leisure  (e),  labor  in  the  import- 
competing  sector,  and  work  in  the  exportable  sector,  in  accordance  with 
e+Lm+L==l.  (3) 
The  agent’s  decisions  are  to  choose  consumption  levels  C”,C’,  leisure  and  labor 
allocation  decisions,  e, L”,  Lz,  and  rate  of  investment  I  to 
Maximize 
I 
m[U(Cm,  Co)  +  V(t)]esP’dt  (4) 
0 
subject  to  the  constraints  (1)  -  (3),  the  given  initial  conditions,  K(0)  =  Ko,b(O)  =  bo, 
and  the  fixed  stock  of  land  T.  The  instantaneous  utility  function  is  taken  to  be  additively 
separable  in  consumptions  and  leisure,  the  functions  U(*,  a), V(e)  are  increasing  concave 
functions  of  their  respective  arguments,  and  the  two  consumption  goods  are  assumed  to 
be.normal  goods.  The  agent’s  rate  of  time  preference,  p,  is  taken  to  be  constant. 
The  current  value  Hamiltonian  for  this  optimization  problem  is  given  by 
H  P  u(c”,C=)  +  V(e)  +  A[(1  +  r’)F(K,L”‘)  +  G(T,L')  +  rb  -  (I+  7?Crn  -c’ 
(5) 
-(I  +r’)$(I,K)+r]  +q’(I-6K)  +w’(l  -e-L”‘-L=) 
5 where  X  is  the  shadow  value  (marginal  utility)  of  wealth  in  the  form  of  internationally 
traded  bonds.  q’  is  the  shadow  value  of  the  agent’s  capital  stock,  and  W*  is  the  shadow 
wage.  Exposition  of  the  model  is  simplified  by  using  the  shadow  value  of  wealth  as  nu- 
meraire.  Consequently,  q  =  q’/X  and  w  =  w’/X  are  defined  to  be  the  market  value  of 
capital  and  the  real  wage  in  terms  of  the  (unitary)  price  of  foreign  bonds. 
The  optimality  conditions  with  respect  to  Cm  , C’,  Lm,  L’,  e,  and  I  are  respectively 
U,(Crn,  C)  =  X(1  +  TC) 
Uz(Crn, c=) = x  (66) 
(1  +  rc)FL(K,Lm)  =  GL(T,L’)  =  w 
v’(e)  = xw 
(1  +  r’)$r(l,  10  =  Q. 
(6~) 
(64 
Equations  (6a)  and  (6b)  are  the  usual  intertemporal  envelope  conditions  that  relate  the 
marginal  utility  of  consumption  of  the  two  goods  to  the  shadow  value  of  wealth.  Equations 
(6~)  and  (6d)  similarly  relate  work  effort  and  leisure  to  the  shadow  value  of  wealth  and 
to  the  real  wage.  Taken  jointly,  equations  (6a)-(6d)  define  the  usual  rate  of  substitution 
conditions  in  consumption  and  work  effort  for  the  representative  agent.  Equation  (se)  links 
the  marginal  installation  costs  of  new  capital,  and  hence,  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation, 
to  the  market  price  of  capital. 
In  addition,  the  shadow  value  of  wealth  and  the  market  value  of  capital  evolve  in 
accordance  with 
6 A =  X(p  -  r)  (6f) 
4  . =  -(l  +  rC)FK(K,  L”)  +  (1+  ri)$W(Z,  ZC)  +  (r  +  6)q.  (%I 
Since  p  and  r  are  both  taken  to  be  fixed,  the  ultimate  attainment  of  a  steady  state  is 
possible  if  and  only  if  p  =  r.  Henceforth  we  assume  this  to  be  the  case.  This  implies  i  =  0 
everywhere,  so  that  X is  always  at  its  steady-state  level  x  (to  be  determined  below). 
Finally,  in  order  to  ensure  that  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  is  met  we  need  to 
impose  the  transversality  conditions 
lim  Abe-”  =  tlim,  qKe-”  =  0.  (6h)  t-00 
The  description  of  the  macroeconomic  equilibrium  is completed  by  introducing  the 
government  budget  constraint.  In  our  analysis  the  role  of  the  government  is a simple  one. 
In  accordance  with  standard  practice  in  the  theory  of  domestic  distortions,  we assume that 
lump-sum  subsidies are  available  to  redistribute  tariff  revenue: 
.c[Cm  -  F(K,L”)]  + &,(z,w  =  *.  (69 
This  equation  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  agent’s  budget  constraint  (1)  implies  that 
the  economy’s  current  account,  which  determines  the  evolution  of  the  stock  of  net  foreign 
assets, may  be  expressed  as 
h =  F(K,  L”)  +  G(T,  L’)  -  C”  -  C’  -  +(I,  K)  +  rb.  (1’) 
Our  treatment  of  the  agent  as a price  taker,  who  therefore  ignores the  aggregate  constraint 
(6i),  is standard  in  the  intertemporal  representative  agent  framework.  One  justification  is 
that  being  in fact  just  one of  a large  number  of  agents,  he is unable  to  infer  his share of  the 
7 total  tariff  revenue.  As  discussed  by  Corden  (1987,  p.  87)  this  raises  problems  of  income 
distribution  and  our  approach  requires  that  the  government  use  lump-sum  subsidies  to 
bring  about  the  appropriate  after-tax  distribution  of  income.’ 
The  complete  macroeconomic  equilibrium  is  thus  described  by  the  static  equations 
(6a)  -  (6e),  with  X  =  1,  (3),  together  with  the  dynamic  equations  (l’),  (3)  and  (6g),  and 
the  transversality  condition  (6h).  The  static  equations  define  the  short-run  equilibrium 
and  may  be  solved  for  Cm,  C’,  !,  L”,  L*,  I  as  the  following  functions  of  the  stock  of  capital, 
the  market  value  of  capital,  the  shadow  value  of  wealth,  and  the  two  tariffs:’ 
C” = C”(X,  9)  c,m  <o,  c,- <o 
C” = C+(X,rC)  c;  < 0, c: k 0 as u,,  f3  0 
(70) 
Ub) 
e  = e(X,  If, rC) 
L”  =  LyK,  I<,  TC) 
L’  =  L’(Ti,  I<,  7’) 
eA  < 0, eK  < 0, er < o  (7c) 
LY>O,  LE>O,  LY>O  (74 
LX  >  0,  L;  <o,  L;  <o  (7e) 
Z =  i(q,  r’)Zf  zp  >  0,  z,  <  0.  (7f) 
The  partial  derivatives  appearing  in  (7)  may  be  obtained  by  differentiating  the  op 
timality  conditions  (6a)  -  (se)  and  are  given  in  the  Appendix.  With  C”  and  C’  being 
independent  of  the  dynamic  variables,  it  follows  that  the  consumption  of  both  goods  is 
constant  through  time,  responding  only  to  changes  in  1  or  T’.  This  extreme  form  of 
8 consumption  smoothing  is  a  consequence  of  the  separability  of  the  utility  function  in  con- 
sumption  and  employment  decisions.  Given  the  assumption  that  both  goods  are  normal  in 
consumption,  an  increase  in  the  shadow  value  of  wealth  leads  to  a  substitution  of  savings 
for  consumption.  The  consumption  of  both  goods  falls,  the  work  effort  in  both  sectors 
rises,  and  leisure  time  is  reduced.  An  increase  in  the  stock  of  capital  raises  the  marginal 
productivity  of  labor  in  the  import-competing  sector,  thereby  attracting  labor  to  that 
sector  away  from  the  export  sector  and  leisure.  An  increase  in  the  market  value  of  capi- 
tal  will  stimulate  investment.  An  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  importable  will  reduce  the 
consumption  of  that  good,  but  may  raise  or  lower  consumption  of  the  exportable  good,  de- 
pending  upon  how  the  reduced  consumption  of  the  former  impacts  on  the  marginal  utility 
of  the  latter.”  The  protection  yielded  by  the  tariff  to  the  import-competing  industry  will 
stimulate  that  sector,  attracting  labor  away  from  the  export  sector  and  leisure.  Finally,  a 
higher  tariff  on  the  investment  good  will  reduce  the  level  of  investment  expenditure.” 
The  evolution  of  the  system  is  determined  by  substituting  the  short-run  equilibrium 
(7a)  -  (7f)  into  the  dynamic  equations  (2),  (6g)  and  (1’)  an  ensuring  that  the  transversality  d 
conditions  (6h)  are  met.  It  is  readily  apparent  that  in  fact  the  dynamics  can  be  determined 
sequentially.  Specifically  equations  (2)  and  (6g)  (after  substitution)  constitute  a  pair  of 
autonomous  differential  equations  in  Q and  K  and  are  the  core  of  the  dynamics.  Note 
that  since  this  pair  of  equations  is  determined  in  part  by  the  steady-state  shadow  value 
of  wealth,  1,  the  steady  state  in  part  determines  the  entire  dynamic  path.  But  having 
determined  IC  and  ~7, equation  (1’)  then  determines  the  accumulation  of  foreign  assets  b. 
III.  DYNAMICS 
We  begin  by  considering  the  dynamic  adjustment  paths  of  K  and  q.  We  first  substitute 
the  solutions  for  L”‘(.)  and  I(.)  into  equations  (6g)  and  (2)  and  linearize  around  the  steady- 
state  equilibrium.  This  enables  the  equilibrium  dynamics  to  be  expressed  by  the  following 
pair  of  linearized  differential  equations 
9 (8) 
where  the  elements  of  the  matrix  in  (8)  are  evaluated  at  steady  state,  and  tildes  denote 
steady-state  equilibrium  values.  i2  The  determinant  of  the  terms  appearing  in  (8)  can  be 
shown  to  be  negative.  so  that  the  long-run  equilibrium  is  a  saddlepoint  with  eigenvalues 
ni  <  0,  p2  >  0.  It  is  clear  that  while  the  capital  stock  must  always  evolve  gradually,  the 
value  of  capital.  4,  may  jump  instantaneously  in  response  to  new  information.  The  stable 
solutions  for  A’  and  q (consistent  with  the  transversality  condition  (6h))  are 
(90) 
q -  i  =  p1( 1 +  T’)Qll(IC  -  I?).  (96) 
The  convexity  of  d  implies  $11  >  0,  so  that  the  stable  arm  described  by  (9b)  is  negatively 
sloped. 
To  determine  the  dynamics  of  the  current  account,  we  substitute  for  Cm(.),  C’(.), 
L”(.),L’(.)  and  I(.)  into  (1’) 
b =  F[iY,  L”(I:,  IC, T’)]  +  G[T,  L’(x,  Ii,  rC)]  -  C”(x:,  9) 
-  C’(I,  rC)  -  $[i(q,  T’)IC,  I<]  +  rb. 
Linearizing  this  equation  around  steady  state  yields 
b=(FK+FLLz+GLL>-6)(1(-I?)-  l  (1+  Ti)l/)l,  (q  -  4)  +  r(b  -  ‘).  (10) 
Next,  using  (9a)  and  (9b),  this  equation  may  be  written  as 
b =  fi(&  -  I+‘l*  +  r(b  -  &)  (11) 
10 where 
Assuming  that  the  economy  starts  out  with  an  initial  stock  of  traded  bonds  b(0)  =  b,,,  the 
solution  to  this  equation  is 
b(t)  =  &+  n(Ko  -  ‘)eP1’  +  Lo 
c11  --f 
-  5 -  -$-(IC,  -  I?)]  e”. 
In  order  for  the  transversality  condition  (6h)  to  be  satisfied,  we  require 
b.  -  a =  A(Ko  -  k) 
PI  --f  (12) 
in  which  case,  the  dynamic  adjustment  path  for  traded  bonds,  consistent  with  long-run 
solvency  is 
b(t)  =  6 +  ‘tKo  -  ‘),,,r 
P1--r  . 
(13) 
Equation  (13)  describes  the  relationship  between  the  accumulation  of  capital  and  that 
of  bonds.  The  quantity  FK  +  FLL~  +  GLL’,  equals  dY/dK,  the  marginal  effect  of  capital 
on  the  value  of  gross  domestic  output,  so  that  dY/dK  -  b  is  the  effect  on  net  national 
output.  A  sufficient  condition  for  the  relationship  between  b and  K  to  be  a  negative  one 
is  that  dY/dK  -  6  2  0. 
IV.  ANALYSIS  OF  TARIFF  CHANGES 
With  the  forward-looking  behavior  in  the  model,  the  dynamic  adjustment  of  the  econ- 
omy  to  tariff  changes  is  determined  primarily  by  changes  in  the  steady-state  capital  stock 
and  shadow  value  of  foreign  bonds.  The  characterization  of  the  steady-state  equilibrium 
conditions  themselves  is  presented  in  the  Appendix.  Any  configuration  of  the  two  tariffs 
can  be  decomposed  analytically  into  a  uniform  tariff,  in  conjunction  with  an  investment 
11 tax  (or  subsidy.  if  the  tariff  on  the  capital  good  is  lower  than  the  tariff  on  the  consumption 
good).  IVe  will  find  it  useful  first  to  analyze  a  uniform  change  in  the  two  tariffs  before 
examining  the  investment  tax  component  of  differential  tariffs. 
A.  A  Uniform  Tariff  Increae 
Evaluating  the  differentials  in  (-4.8)  one  can  establish  that  starting  from  zero  initial 
tariffs  (free  trade),  the  imposition  of  a  small  uniform  tariff  (dr’  =  dr’  =  dr  >  0)  implies 
dl? 
t% 
dr=  J 
FKLLy  - 
FLLF  +  GLL;  -  C,m  -  C; 
FLL~  +  GLLE,  -  C,m  -  Ci 




The  expression  (14a)  for  the  change  in  the  capital  stock  contains  two  terms  within  the 
brackets.  The  first  term,  the  substitution  effect  of  the  tariff,  indicates  that  imposition  of  a 
small  uniform  tariff  increases  the  capital  stock  by  shifting  labor  into  the  import-competing 
sector  and  thereby  raising  the  margirml  product  of  capital.  The  second  term,  the  wealth 
effect  of  the  tariff  on  labor  supply,  while  generally  of  opposite  sign  to  the  first  term,  is 
nevertheless  dominated  by  the  latter,  so  that  overall  the  long-run  capital  stock  increases 
unambiguously. 
Equation  (14b)  indicates  that,  beginning  from  free  trade,  a  uniform  tariff  on  the 
consumption  and  investment  goods  will  lower  the  shadow  value  of  foreign  bonds  (x).  Two 
effects  are  involved.  The  first  term  within  the  braces  shows  that,  holding  the  capital  stock 
constant,  the  effect  of  the  tariff  on  labor  supply  and  consumption  is  to  improve  the  trade 
balance,  thereby  relaxing  the  foreign  exchange  constraint  and  lowering  the  shadow  value 
of  foreign  bonds. 
12 Secondly,  the  accumulation  of  capital  following  the  imposition  of  the  tariff  further 
lowers  the  shadow  value  of  foreign  bonds  by  further  relaxing  the  foreign  exchange  con- 
straint.  In  equation  (14b),  the  term  (-FK&~)/(FKK  +  FKLLz)  measures  the  increase 
in  the  capital  stock,  holding  labor  supply  constant,  that  will  accompany  the  tariff.  The 
term  dY/dK  -  r  -  6 measures  the  excess  of  the  economywide  marginal  product  of  capital 
relative  to  the  opportunity  cost  of  those funds.  In  general,  this  expression  can  be written 
in  terms  of  underlying  preferences  and  technology  as follows: 
dY  +  -  rc  (1 +  s’)FLFKL(V”P  -  XGLL)  -- 
dK 
r-b=F~  l+ri  +  1  1  X(1  +  W-'LLGLL  +  V”[(l  +  +)Fu  +  Gu]’ 
(15) 
Under  free  trade  (se =  ri  =  0),  equation  (15)  will  be greater  than  or equal to zero,  with 
equality  holding  only  in the  limit  as labor  supply  becomes perfectly  inelastic  (V”  -+  -co).13 
With  a finitely  elastic  labor  supply,  the  tariff  raises the  agent’s  supply  of  labor  and  causes 
the  accompanying  accumulation  of  capital  to  relax  the  foreign  exchange  constraint  by 
the  amount  dY/dK  -  r  -  6  for  each  unit  of  capital  that  is purchased.  In  the  presence 
of  a  preexisting  uniform  tariff  (r  >  0),  the  marginal  product  of  capital  dY/dK  will 
exceed  the  equilibrium  cost  of  capital  r  +  6 if  and  only  if  the  labor  supply  is sufficiently 
elastic.14  The  last  two  terms in  parentheses in  the  second term  of  equation  (14b)  therefore 
measure the  total  amount  of  foreign  exchange  generated  by  the  accumulation  of  capital  in 
response to  the  tariff.  The  term  ~1 /(pi  -  r)  converts  the  gain  in foreign  exchange  from  the 
accumulation  of  capital  into  present  value  terms  by  taking  into  account  the  adjustment 
speed of  the  capital  stock. 
Transitional  Dynamics 
The  stable  dynamic  adjustment  paths  followed  by  Q and  IL’ rue  described  by  (9a,  9b) 
and  are a negatively-sloped  saddlepath  illustrated  by  XX  in  Figure  1.  As long  as no future 
shock is anticipated,  the  system must  lie on the  stable  locus XX.  An  unanticipated  increase 
13 in  the  uniform  tariff  T  causes  the  market  price  of  capital  q to  increase  instantaneously  by 
an  amount 
dq(‘4  -= 
dr  -P1(1f  r)irrg  >  0.  (16) 
This  is  represented  by  an  upward  shift  of  XX  to  X’X’.  If  initially,  the  economy  is  in 
steady  state  at  the  point  A  lying  on  XX,  the  new  steady  state  corresponding  to  the  higher 
uniform  tariff  is  at  B  on  X’X’  with  a  higher  capital  stock  and  a  higher  market  price  of 
capital  (although  FK  =  r  +  6  at  both  points  A  and  B). 
The  instantaneous  increase  in  q given  by  (16)  is  represented  by  the  jump  from  A  to  C 
on  the  new  stable  locus  X’X’.  Since  the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  is  proportional  to  q, 
capital  begins  to  accumulate  with  the  increase  in  the  uniform  tariff.  Along  the  saddlepath, 
the  rate  of  capital  accumulation  declines  as  the  economy  approaches  the  new  steady  state 
at  point  B.  As  capital  accumulates,  the  economy’s  stock  of  net  foreign  assets  declines,  as 
established  in  (12),  reflecting  a  deficit  in  the  current  account  of  the  balance  of  payments. 
Besides  inducing  the  agent  to  alter  investment  expenditure,  the  higher  tariff  alters 
the  agent’s  total  supply  of  labor,  as  well  as  the  allocation  of  labor  supply  between  the 
two  sectors  of  the  economy.  The  initial  response  of  labor  supply  (L  =  1 -  f)  to  the 
higher  tariff  can  be  decomposed  into  a  direct  substitution  effect,  aL/ar,  and  a  wealth 
effect  (aL/8x)(aI/&).  As  capital  accumulates,  the  rise  in  the  real  wage  over  time  pro- 
duces  an  additional  substitution  effect  on  labor  supply,  whose  cumulative  magnitude  is 
(aL/aI?)(aI?/&).  Equations  (17a)  -  (17~)  divide  the  long-run  responses  of  total  labor 
supply  and  the  sectoral  allocations  into  the  initial  substitution  and  wealth  effects  and  into 
the  substitution  effect  that  accompanies  the  accumulation  of  capital: 
di  iL  a;.  ai  a’L  a> 
-=-+  --  -v 
dr  ar  ax  a7  +a~  a7  (17a) 
14 dtz  aL=  akai  a.i=ai  -=-  --  --  dr  at  + ax ar + ax  ar' 
(176) 
(17c) 
As  seen  in  (17a),  while  the  substitution  effect  of  the  higher  tariff  increases  labor  supply, 
the  wealth  effect  associated  with  the  loosening  of  the  foreign  exchange  constraint  has  the 
opposite  effect,  so  that  the  initial  employment  effects  of  the  tariff  are  ambiguous.  Over 
time,  as  capital  accumulates,  employment  will  unambiguously  increase  relative  to  its  initial 
response  to  the  higher  tariff. 
In  terms  of  the  sectoral  allocation  of  labor,  labor  supply  to  the  import-competing 
sector  follows  the  same  pattern  as  overall  labor  supply;  the  initial  wealth  and  substitution 
effects  are  offsetting,  but  the  additional  substitution  effect  created  by  the  rising  real  wage 
(as  capital  accumulates)  increases  labor  supply  over  time.  In  the  export  sector,  both 
wealth  and  substitution  effects  initially  lower  labor  supply.  As  the  economy  accumulates 
capital,  labor  supply  continues  to  decline  in  that  sector,  so  that  the  long-run  decline  in 
employment  in  the  export  sector  is  even  greater. 
B.  Increase  in  the  Tariff  on  the  Investment  Good 
Given  an  initial  uniform  tariff,  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  repre- 
sents  a  tax  on  the  purchase  price  of  investment  goods  that  will  lower  the  steady-state  size 
of  the  capital  stock,  as  shown  in  equation  (Isa): 
dk  -(r  +  @a22 
p=  J  <  0. 
Note  that  equation  (18a)  is  similar  to  the  expression  for  the  change  in  the  capital  stock  from 
an  increase  in  the  uniform  tariff,  equation  (14a),  except  that  the  wealth  and  substitution 
15 effects  found  in  the  former  expression  are  replaced  by  -(r  +  6),  which  represents  the 
increased  steady-state  cost  of  a higher  purchase  price  of  capital. 
Starting  from  an  initial  positive  uniform  tariff,  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  invest- 
ment  good  will  have  an  ambiguous  effect  on  the  shadow  value  of  foreign  bonds,  as  shown 
by  equation  (ISb): 
Yote  that  equation  (1Sb)  is  similar  to  the  expression  for  the  change  in  the  shadow  value 
of  foreign  bonds  following  an  increase  in  the  uniform  tariff,  equation  (14b),  except  that 
the  direct  substitution  effect  on  labor  supply  and  consumption  is  absent  and  the  term 
that  captures  the  change  in  the  capital  stock  tram  the  uniform  tariff,  (-FKLL~)/(FKK  + 
FI(LLE),  is  replaced  by  (r  +  ~)/(FKK  +  FKLLE). 
The  ambiguity  in  sign  of  equation  (Mb)  ’  IS  d ue  to  the  term  dY/dK  -  P -  6.  Starting 
from  a positive  uniform  tariff,  equation  (15)  shows  that  the  sign  of  dY/dK  -r  -  6 depends 
on  the  elasticity  of  labor  supply.  If  labor  supply  is  very  elastic,  dY/dK  -  r  -  6  will  be 
positive,  so  that  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  will  tighten  the  foreign 
exchange  constraint  and  raise  the  shadow  value  of  foreign  bonds.  If  labor  supply  is  very 
inelastic,  dY/dK  -  r  -  6 will  be  negative,  and  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment 
good  will  relax  the  foreign  exchange  constraint,  thereby  lowering  the  shadow  value  of 
foreign  bonds. 
Transitional  Dynamics 
The  dynamic  adjustment  followed  by  Q and  K  following  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on 
the  investment  good  is  illustrated  in  Figure  2.  Starting  from  the  initial  market  price  of 
capital,  Q =  1 +  ri,  the  increase  in  the  investment  tariff  shifts  the  I?  =  0 locus  upward  by 
the  amount  of  the  tariff  increase.  The  price  of  capital  initially  jumps  from  point  A  to  point 
16 C  on  the  new  stable  locus  X’X’.  Since  the  initial  increase  in  Q  is  less  than  the  increase 
in  the  tariff,  n/(1  +  T’)  declines  end  the  capital  stock  begins  to  decrease.  Eventually,  the 
economy  reaches  the  new  steady  state  at  i3,  having  a  lower  capital  stock  and  an  increase 
in  the  market  price  of capital  by  the  amount  of the  additional  tariff.  During  the  transition, 
the  economy’s  stock  of net  foreign  assets  increases. 
The  initial  labor  supply  response  of the  agent  to  the  tariff  is  driven  entirely  by  wealth 
effects.  If  labor  supply  is  elastic  enough  (so  that  dY/dK  -  r  -  6  >  0),  the  higher  tariff 
will  raise  total  labor  supply  and  employment  in  each  of  the  two  sectors.  If  labor  supply  is 
relatively  inelastic  (so  that  dY/dK  -  r -  6 <  0),  the  higher  investment  tariff  will  lower  total 
labor  supply  and  employment  in  each  of  the  two  sectors.  Regardless  of the  initial  response 
of  labor  supply,  as  capital  decreases  the  total  supply  of  labor  and  the  supply  of  labor 
to  the  import-competing  sector  will  decline  as  the  real  wage  falls.  On  the  other  hand, 
employment  in  the  export  sector  will  increase  as  the  capital  stock  declines.  Equations 
(19s)  -  (19c)  divide  the  overall  response  of  total  labor  supply  and  labor  supply  in  the  two 
sectors  into  the  wealth  effect  and  the  substitution  effect  that  accompany  the  decumulation 
of  capital: 
dt  d;.  d;  d;,  dit 
dr’=xds’+  -- 
dK  ds’ 
dL”  d:”  di  dim  d% 
x=--+ 
-- 
dX  dr’  dK  ds’ 
-  - 
dL=  d*Lr  ;A  dL=  dl; 
-s---,+--. 
dr’  dX  dr’  dK  d+ 




Much  of the  focus  of the  immiserizing  growth  literature  has  been  on  the  welfare  effects 
of  ezogenow  flows  of  investment  in  the  presence  of a  tariff.  As  Neary  and  Ruane  (1988) 
17 have  demonstrated,  an  equally  important  analytical  focus  involves  the  computation  of  the 
welfare  effects  of  endogenour  flows  of  investment  in  response  to  the  imposition  of  a  tariff. 
With  regard  to  these  endogenous  investment  flows,  Neary  and  Ruane  considered  two  polar 
cases  of  complete  mobility  or  immobility  of  capital,  so  that  in  either  case  the  economy’s 
response  to  a  tariff  change  is  instantaneous.  By  contrast,  the  slow  adjustment  of  capital 
in  our  model  requires  an  analysis  of  the  welfare  effects  of  tariff  protection  over  the  entire 
time  path  of  instantaneous  utility  of  a  representative  agent. 
We  define  the  agent’s  instantaneous  utility  at  time  t,  Z(t))  as 
z(t)  =  U(Crn,  c=)  +  v(e)  GOa) 
with  the  overall  level  of  welfare  being  (with  p =  r): 
w  = 
/ 
-(U(Cm,  C’)  +  V(t)]e-“dt  E 
I 
Om  Z(t)e-“dt.  Wb) 
0 
We  shall  discuss  the  effects  of  the  tariffs  on  both  the  time  path  of  Z(t)  and  total  welfare 
IV,  when  C”,C’,  and  e  follow  the  optimal  paths  described  by  (7a)  -  (7c),  with  cap- 
ital  stock  being  accumulated  in  accordance  with  (9a).  We  do  this  by  linearizing  (20a) 
about  its  steady-state  level  and  then  substituting  the  linearized  expression  into  (20b),  and 
integrating,  to  yield  an  approximate  measure  of  the  welfare  of  the  representative  agent. 
We  have  already  remarked  that  the  two  consumption  levels  C”,C’  always  adjust 
instantaneously  to  their  respective  steady-state  levels  in  response  to  an  unanticipated 
permanent  change  in  the  tariff.  Leisure,  being  a function  of  K,  follows  a transitional  path, 
which  may  be  linearly  approximated  by 
e z i+  eK(KO  -  R)eClt.  (21) 
Accordingly,  Z(t)  and  W  may  be  approximated  linearly  by  the  expressions 
18 z(t)  r  U(@,  F)  + V(i)  + v’eK(&  -  k)e+f  (22a) 
Wb) 
where  the  steady-state  values  of consumption  and  leisure  are  respectively 
C” = P(X,  7y;  c=  = C’(s;,  P);  i = qX,  IT,  P). 
The  fist  term  in  (22b)  represents  the  agent’s  welfare  if  the  steady  state  were  attained 
instantaneously.  The  second  term  reflects  the  adjustment  to  this  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
steady  state  is  reached  only  gradually  along  the  transitional  path. 
A.  Increase  in  the  Uniform  Tariff 
The  effect  of a higher  uniform  tariff  on  the  level  of instantaneous  welfare  Z(t)  is  given 
by 
de  s(t)  _  u  dcm  , di!  dI? 
dr 
mdr  +  Uz-&  +  v  ;i;  -  V’tKe”‘~. 
Using  the  fact  that 
d&  -= 
dr 
cj  dX 
*z+Cj  j=m,x 
di  dx  dk+! 
z=  h;iT+eKdr  7 
and  that  in  equilibrium 
u,,,  =  X( I  +  +),  U.  =  X,  V’  =  XGr. 
(23) 
(23)  b ecomes 
19 (24) 
Since  dIq/dT  >  0,  this  implies 
+ I[(  1 + .‘)C,m  + c;  + GL.e,]. 
dZ(O)  > dZ(t)  >  c,  -- 
dr  -  ds  -  dr 
As  shown  in  the  Appendix,  starting  from  free  trade  (zero  tariffs),  the  imposition 
of  a  uniform  tariff  has  the  following  effects  on  the  short-run  and  steady-state  levels  of 
instantaneous  utility 
--%($$-.-6)d~  di  - 
ds  Pl  --f 
dr  <  0. 
(250) 
(25b) 
The  total  change  in  welfare  from  the  introduction  of  the  uniform  tariff  can  then  be  calcu- 
lated  as  follows 
Equations  (25a),  (25b),  and  (26)  allow  us  to  establish  the  following  proposition: 
Proposition  1.  Starting  from  free  trade,  the  imposition  of  a  uniform  tariff  raises 
instantaneous  utility  in  the  short  run  while  lowering  it  in  the  long  run. 
In  common  with  the  usual  static  welfare  analysis  of  tariff  changes  in  the  neighborhood 
of  free  trade,  our  analysis  finds  that  a smalI  uniform  tariff  leaves  total  welfare  (as  measured 
20 by  the  discounted  value  of  instantaneous  utility)  unchanged,  but  it  does  so  in  a  way 
that  involves  an  intertemporal  tradeoff  in  utility.  Figure  3  illustrates  the  behavior  of 
instantaneous  utility  over  time,  where  the  shaded  areas  are  the  same  in  discounted  value 
terms. 
The  general  expression  for  the  change  in  welfare  resulting  from  increasing  a  pre- 
existing  uniform  tariff  is  given  by  equation  (27): 
dW  1 
dr  =  F’ 
z(FLL;”  -  Cr)  -  FLL: 
I 
[GL(LyL’h’  -  L”,L;)  +  (L;CLf  -  (I+  T)L~C;)]~  5  0. 
(27) 
The  first  term  in  this  expression  is  the  welfare  cost  of  the  change  in  the  uniform  tariff, 
holding  the  capital  stock  fixed.  The  second  term  is  the  welfare  cost  associated  with  the 
worsening  of  the  initial  distortion  as  capital  accumulates.  The  latter  welfare  cost  is  in- 
fluenced  by  the  speed  of  adjustment  of  the  capital  stock,  with  a  more  rapid  adjustment 
causing  a  greater  deterioration  in  welfare.r5 
When  adjustment  costs  are  linear  (+IJ  =  0),  adjustment  is  instantaneous  (~1  +  -00) 
and  the  term  c(r/(pr  -  r)  equals  one.  In  the  other  limiting  case,  as  adjustment  costs 
become  infinitely  convex  ($11  -+  oo),  the  term  rr/(/~i  -  r)  approaches  zero.  In  this  latter 
case,  adjustment  of  the  economy  to  a  higher  tariff  becomes  infinitely  slow,  so  that  the 
discounted  value  of  the  increase  in  foreign  exchange  from  the  tariff  becomes  negligible. 
These  two  polar  cases  of  adjustment  costs  correspond  to  the  distinction  made  by  Neary 
and  Ruane  (1988)  between  perfect  capital  mobility  and  perfect  capital  immobility.  Like 
Nesry  and  Ruane,  we find  that  welfare  is unambiguously  lower  for  an  economy  with  mobile 
capital  relative  to  the  economy  with  immobile  capital,  since  the  accumulation  of  capital 
worsens  the  initial  distortion  produced  by  the  tariff.  In  addition,  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  adjustment  speed  of  the  economy  to  a  higher  tariff  varies  inversely  with  the  elasticity 
21 of  labor  supply.  In  the  polar  cases.  where  the  supply  of  labor  becomes  perfectly  elastic 
/ I-”  =  0)  or  perfectly  inelastic  (V”  -+  -co),  the  entire  adjustment  of  the  economy’s  factors 
of  production  to  the  higher  tariff  is  borne  either  by  the  supply  of  labor,  or  by  the  stock  of 
capital.  rcspectively.‘6 
B.  Increase  in  the  Tariff  on  the  Investment  Good 
The  welfare  analysis  of  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  imported  investment  good  is 
analogous  to  an  increase  in  the  uniform  tariff,  but  is  somewhat  simpler  because  of  the 
absence  of  the  direct  effect  on  the  consumption-leisure  choice.  Parallel  to  (24)  and  (24’) 
we  have: 
dZ(O)<dZ(t)<$ 
ds’  -  ds’  -  dr’  (28’) 
;\gain,  as  shown  in  the  Appendix,  dZ(O)/dT’,  dZ/dT’  can  be  expressed  as  follows 
(29u) 
.4s  equation  (29a)  indicates,  the  sign  of  the  short-run  change  in  instantaneous  utility 
following  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  depends  on  the  term  dY/dK  - 
r  -  6.  As  shown  in  (15),  starting  from  an  initial  positive  uniform  tariff,  dY/dK  -  P -  6 
will  be  positive  if  labor  supply  is  sufficiently  elastic  and  will  be  negative  otherwise.”  If 
labor  supply  is  elastic,  the  increase  in  the  tariff  will  cause  a  decrease  in  consumption 
(since  dY/dK  -  T -  6  >  0  implies  a  tightening  of  the  foreign  exchange  constraint  as 
capital  decumulates)  and  an  initial  increase  in  labor  supply  as  the  agent  intertemporally 
22 substitutes  work  effort  into  the  present  to  take  advantage  of  the  transitorily  high  capital 
stock.  This  intertemporal  substitution  of  labor  for  leisure  produces  an  initial  drop  in 
instantaneous  utility.  Over  time,  labor  supply  will  decrease  below  its  initial  level,  causing 
a  rise  over  time  in  instantaneous  utility. 
If  labor  supply  is  inelastic,  the  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  will  pro- 
duce  an  increase  in  consumption  (since  dY/dK  -  r  -  6  <  0 implies  a relaxing  of  the  foreign 
exchange  constraint  as  capital  decumulates)  and  a  decline  in  the  work  effort.  Instanta- 
neous  utility  will  initially  jump  upward  and  will  continue  to  rise  in  response  to  increasing 
leisure  as  the  capital  stock  decreases.  Figure  4  shows  the  response  of  instantaneous  utility 
for  the  cues  of  elastic  and  inelastic  labor  supply. 
Starting  from  an  initial  non-negative  uniform  tariff,  the  total  change  in  welfare  from 
the  change  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  can  be  shown  to  be  the  following 
dW  ~TFL  ~1  -=--  - 
dr’  1  1  r  a22  ~1  -  r 
[GL(LYL’K  -  Lm,Lf)  +  (L;Cf  -  (I+  r&C&  2  o.  (30) 
Equation  (30)  is  sufficient  to  demonstrate  the  following: 
Proposition  2.  (Second  Best  Tariff  Policy).  Starting  from  an  initial  positive  level  of 
a uniforms  tariff,  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  will  always  be  welfare 
improving.  Therefore,  if  the  tariff  on  the  consumption  good  cannot  be  lowered,  the 
second  best  optimal  tariff  policy  will  set  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  higher  than 
the  tariff  on  the  consumption  good. 
Proposition  2  embodies  two  general  principles.  First,  if  all  three  goods  (importable 
consumption,  exportable,  and  investment)  were  general  equilibrium  substitutes,  the  tariff 
on  the  investment  good  would  be  set  lower  than  the  tariff  on  the  consumption  good;  see e.g., 
Lipsey  and  Lancaster  (1956).  In  our  model,  the  imported  capital  good  and  the  exportable 
good  are  general  equilibrium  complements  in  the  long-run  equilibrium  of  the  model:  an 
23 increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  reduces  imports  of  the  investment  good  and 
induces  a  reallocation  of  labor  towards  the  exportable  sector,  thus  increasing  output  of 
the  exportable  good.  Consequently,  standard  theory  of second  best  trade  policies  (see e.g., 
Bertrand  and  Vanek  (1971),  Lloyd  (1974))  implies  that  the  direct  welfare  loss  from  raising 
the  tariff  on  the  investment  good  (and  thus  reducing  its  imports)  is  more  than  offset  by 
the  indirect  welfare  gains  as  demand  spills  over  from  both  the  exportable  good  and  the 
investment  good  onto  the  importable  consumption  good,  causing  a  large  welfare-raising 
increase  in  consumption  good  imports. 
The  second  general  principle  embodied  in  Proposition  2  is  a  result  of  Findlay  and 
Wellisz  (1976)  that  factor  taxes  may  raise  welfare  by  correcting  the  factor  market  distor- 
tions  created  by  the  consumption  tariff.  In  our  model,  the  investment  tariff  offsets  the 
distorted  rental  rate  on  capital  produced  by  a  consumption  tariff,  by  acting  like  a  factor 
tax  on  capital  that  raises  the  cost  of capital  goods  and  the  steady-state  required  rate  of 
return  on  capital. 
VI.  TARIFF  REFORM 
Many  economies  are  characterized  by  tariff  structures  in  which  the  tariffs  on  consump 
tion  goods  exceed  those  on  investment  goods.  Discussions  of trade  policy  in  such  economies 
often  focus  on  issues  pertaining  to  tariff  reform.  An  extensive  theoretical  literature  has 
shown  that  in  a  static  context,  two  simple  methods  exist  to  ensure  that  piecemeal  (incom- 
plete)  tariff  reforms  will  be  welfare  improving.  The  concetlino  method  proposes  lowering 
the  highest  tariff,  see  Bertrand  and  Vanek  (1971),  Corden  (1974);  the  method  of  radial 
reduction  advocates  reducing  tariffs  by  the  same  proportion;  see  Foster  and  Sonnenschein 
(1970),  Bruno  (1972). 
Propositions  3 and  4 (proofs  of whch  are  provided  in  the  Appendix)  yield  results  which 
integrate  the  piecemeal  tariff  reform  literature’s  concern  regarding  the  welfare  consequences 
of tariff-induced  relative  price  changes  with  the  immiserizing  growth  literature’s  concerns 
24 regarding  the  welfare  consequences  of  tariff-induced  changes  in  the  capital  stock. 
Proposition  3.  (Concertina  Method).  Starting  from  initial  tariff  levels  T’,  TV,  with 
7’  <  7’,  a  reduction  in  the  tariff  on  the  consumption  good  is  welfare  improving. 
4s  shown  by  equation  (A.23),  there  are  two  components  to  the  welfare  gains  in  Proposition 
3.  The  tirst  is  the  static  gain.  holding  the  capital  stock  constant.  The  second  is  the 
intertemporal  gain  created  by  the  welfare-improving  decline  in  the  capital  stock. 
Proposition  4.  (Method  of  Radial  Reductions).  Starting  from  initial  tariff  lev- 
els  T’,T~,  with  7’  <  TV,  a  radial  reduction  in  the  two  tariffs,  related  by  dri/si  = 
pdF/+,  (p  >  0),  will  be  welfare  improving,  as  long  as  p  <  I=(  1 +  T~)/T~(~  +  7’).  In 
particular,  the  case  /J =  1 corresponds  to  a proportionate  reduction  in  the  two  tariffs 
and  clearly  satisfies  the  criterion  for  the  tariff  reduction  to  be  welfare  improving. 
As  shown  in  the  Appendix,  a radial  tariff  reduction  will  result  in  a static  and  intertem- 
poral  welfare  gain  from  lowering  the  consumption  tariff  that  will  be  partially  of&t  by  the 
inter-temporal  welfare  loss  caused  by  the  reduction  in  the  investment  tariff.  As  long  as  the 
tariff  reduction  is  proportionate,  however,  the  welfare  gain  from  the  former  will  outweigh 
the  loss  from  the  latter. 
The  concertina  method  and  method  of  radial  reductions  provide  good  theoretical  guid- 
ance  for  piecemeal  tariff  reforms,  especially  if  such  reforms  are  part  of  a  longer-run  move 
towards  free  trade.  However,  whether  for  revenue  or  for  other  domestic  policy  reasons, 
there  are  few,  if  any,  developing  countries  that  adopt  free  trade  as  a  goal  of  tariff  reform. 
Rather,  tariff  reform  generally  attempts  to  lower  the  average  tariff  rate  and  to  establish 
greater  uniformity  of  tariff  levels,  without  eliminating  them.  The  twin  goals  of  a  lower 
average  rate  and  greater  uniformity  of  tariffs  frequently  imply  that  the  lowest  tariffs  are 
raised,  at  the  same  time  that  the  highest  tariffs  are  lowered,  thereby  sandwiching  the 
other  tariffs  in  between.  For  example,  in  Korea  between  1966  and  1968  the  average  tariff 
25 on  nondurable  consumer  goods  was  lowered  from  74.2  percent  to  43.2  percent,  while  at  the 
same  time  the  average  tariffs  on  transport  equipment  and  on  machinery  were  raised  from 
12.8  percent  to  19.8  percent  and  from  25.5  percent  to  47.0  percent  respectively  (Frank, 
Kim,  and  Westphal  (1975,  p.  61)).  As  another  example,  Chile’s  tariff  reform  of  January 
16,  1975  lowered  most  tariff  rates  but  raised  tariff  rates  on  capital  good  imports  that  had 
previously  been  subject  to  low  tariff  rates  (de  la  Cuadra  and  Hachette  (1991)). 
Because  the  existing  piecemeal  tariff  reform  literature  takes  factor  supplies  BS given, 
that  literature  cannot  offer  much  guidance  with  respect  to  the  intertemporal  welfare  effects 
associated  with  tariff  reforms  that  resemble  the  Korean  or  Chilean  programs.  Under  our 
assumption  that  investment  goods  are  general  equilibrium  complements  with  exportable 
goods  (as  discussed  in  connection  with  Proposition  2),  we  are  able  to  establish  the  following 
result: 
Proposition  5.  (The  Two-Handed  C oncertina  Method).  Starting  from  initial  tariff 
levels  T’,  rC,  with  7’  <  7c,  an  increase  in  the  tariff  on  the  investment  good,  in  con- 
junction  with  a  reduction  in  the  tariff  on  the  consumption  good,  is  welfare  improving. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The  preceding  sections  have  laid  out  a  model  that  describes  the  reaction  of  a  com- 
petitive  economy  to  tariff  protection.  As  in  standard  analyses  of  tariff  protection,  our 
representative  agent  alters  consumption  decisions  and  the  allocation  of  labor  among  pro- 
ductive  activities  in  response  to  a tariff  on  the  consumption  good.  As  in  the  literature  on 
immiserizing  growth,  the  agent  accumulates  capital  in  response  to  a  tariff  on  the  consump- 
tion  good. 
Our  model  contributes  to  the  welfare  analysis  of  protection  by  adding  an  endogenous 
labor  supply  choice,  incorporating  costs  of  adjustment  to  the  installation  of  capital,  and 
specifying  a  tariff  on  the  imported  investment  good.  These  additions  all  move  the  welfare 
26 analysis  of  protection  in  a direction  that  highlights  the  cost  of  the  intertemporal  distortions 
produced  by  protective  trade  policies. 
The  analysis  has  led,  in  the  context  of  a  specific  factors  model  of  production,  to  an 
integration  of  the  immiserizing  growth  literature’s  concern  for  the  welfare  consequences 
of  factor  adjustment  to  tariffs  at  fixed  relative  prices  with  the  piecemeal  tariff  reform 
literature’s  concern  for  the  welfare  consequences  of  tariff-induced  relative  price  changes  at 
fixed  factor  endowments.  Among  our  welfare  propositions  on  piecemeal  tariff  reform,  we 
believe  that  Proposition  5,  regarding  the  “two-handed  concertina”  method  of  tariff  reform, 
is  of  practical  importance  for  the  evaluation  of  tariff  reforms  which  raise  tariffs  on  capital 
goods  as  part  of  a  move  toward  a relatively  uniform,  but  non-zero,  tariff  level. 
Implicit  throughout  the  paper’s  welfare  analysis  is  the  importance  of  the  time  path 
of  instantaneous  utility  in  response  to  the  imposition  of  tariffs  or  to  various  types  of  tariff 
reform.  Increases  in  the  consumption  tariff  and  decreases  in  the  investment  tariff  cause 
instantaneous  utility  to  be  higher  in  the  short  run  than  in  the  long  run.  Consequently, 
our  results  suggest  that  empirical  evaluation  of  any  given  protectionist  policy  or  piecemeal 
tariff  reform  effort  should  not  rely  solely  on  short-run  welfare  results,  since  the  sign  of  the 
welfare  integral  measuring  the  discounted  change  in  the  entire  time  path  of  instantaneous 
utility  for  any  given  change  in  tariff  policy  may  be  opposite  to  the  sign  of  the  change  in 
short-run  utility. 
Future  work  on  the  intertemporal  welfare  consequences  of  tariff  policy  could  usefully 
employ  a more  general  specification  of  the  production  technology  in  order  to  generalize  this 
paper’s  results.  However,  the  essential  welfare  results  of  this  paper  will  probably  remain 
unchanged  as  long  as  investment  goods  are  general  equilibrium  substitutes  for  exportable 
goods,  a  condition  that  appears  to  characterize  most  import-substituting  trade  regimes  in 
developing  countries. 
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I.  Pmpcrftes  of  Short-Run  Solufions  (7) 
Taking  the differential of equations  (64,  (6b) yields 
leading to the following partial derivatives. where the assumption  of normality  for C”’  and Cc is used  in 
signing  $  and 5. 
8C’ 
4Umm  X-=D  -(l+r~)cJ,)<O;  $+x+ 
(A.11 
(A.74 
where  D  E  (I ~,~J’ss  -  f&  > 0. Nut,  taking ditferentials  of (Be), (6d), together with  (s), 
i 
X(1 + TC)FLL  0  -V”  dLm 
II II 
-(l  +  +)F,dX-  x(1 +  rC)FLKdK  -XFcdsc 
0  ~GLL  -VI’  dL=  =  -G&d1 
1  1  1  dt  0  I 
we  obtain 
BL” 
-  =  &+rC)GrrFL  >  0;  g  =  81  -‘(l  +;‘lFLx  [xc,,  +  “7  >  0;  $$  =  +f&  +  “jr]  >  0 
(A.31 
8L’ 
-  ~(l+rC)FLLGL  >o;  +$ 
-x-IT 
71  +  3FLKV”  <  o;  D,  BL’  _  XF~V”  <  o 
8r=  D’  (A.4) 
8t 
=  ‘(1  +  ~WLLFL  +  GLFLL]  <  0;  g  =  ““,’  “)GLLFLK  <  0;  2  =  &  <  0  g  D’  (A.5) 
where D’ H X2(1 +  +)FLLGLL  +  V”T[(l+  +)FLL  + GLI,] >  0. Finally, (71) follows  directly  from (6e) and 
the linear homogeneity  of $J. 2.  Sfeody-Sfafc  Epuilibnum 
Steady-state  equilibrium  is  reached  when  I?  =  d =  b =  0,  so  that  (2)  implies  a  grow  rate  of investment 
equal  to  the  rate  of depreciation 
i=ak. 
Given  that  +1(6K,  K)  =  1,  (6e)  implies  a steady-state  shadow  value  of capital 
+=  1+z’  (A.6b) 
Furthermore,  using  (A&),  (A.6b)  and  noting  from  footnote  7  that  $K(~K,  K)  =  0,  (6g)  implies 
(r+  6). 
(A.60) 
(~.6~) 
The  relevant  steady-state  cost  of capital,  to  which  the  marginal  physical  product  of capital  is  the  rental  rate 
r  +  6,  adjusted  by  tariffs. 
The  third  steady-state  condition,  that  the  Row  of bonds  cease,  yielda 
(A.6d) 
requiring  that  the  current  account  balance  must  eventually  be  zero. 
In  principle,  equations  (7a)  -  (7e),  (12),  (A.6a)  -  (A&l)  J  ‘ointly  determine  the  steady-state  solutions  for 
the  entire  economy.  For  our  purposes,  it  is more  convenient  to  focus  on  the  steady-state  relationships  in  the 
form 
(1  +  T’)FK[~,L~(~,I?,T~)]  =  (1  +ri)(r+6)  (A.70) 
(F[J?,Lm(X,k,rC)]  +G[T,L=(X,k,F)] 
(A.7b) 
-  C”(x,  7’)  -  C=(x,  7’)  -  6J?  +  ri  =  0 
i-60=  +ri’  -  Ka) 
Pl  --r 
which  jointly  determine  the  equilibrium  stock  of capital,  J?-, the  shadow  value  of wealth,  1,  and  the  stock  of 
traded  bonds,  i.  From  these  relationships,  the  remaining  aspects  of the  steady  state  can  be  derived. Taking  differential  of equationa  (A.78)  - (A.7c).  WC  obtain 
where 
011  I  (l+  r’)[Fjx  +  FKLL;]  =  FKKG~LV”X(~  -t 7’) 
D’  <o 
a,* I  (1+  I’)FKLL;~  =  -(l+  T’)~XFKLGLLFL  >  o 
D’ 
.~,~~-~=F~-~+FLL~+GLL’,=FK-~+  ;rcl  +  I’)FLFL&“‘T~  -  ~GLL) 
IT 
aa1  =FLL~+GLL;-G-C; 
=-  x~lLyr’)[~j~LL  +  G;FLL]  _  [(l  +  r’)um  +  fJmg  -  (2 +  +‘)Umz]  >  o 
~z~FLL:+G,L:-CT-c;i  -XF$TGLL 
Ly 
-  rev”1 _ m,,  -  &la,) > o 
D 
(.4.&l) 
D’  =  x?l+  +VLLGLL  +  V”~[(l+  ~‘)FLL  +  GrLJ  <  o. 
Stability  requires  that the determinant in  (A.8)  be positive. 3.  Denvotwn  of  WclJan  Properire~ 
R  Increase  in  Uniform  Taritf 
Setting  t  =  0  in  (24), 
fy  =  I[(  1 +  r)c;”  +  c;  +  G‘&]  dr  g  +  I[(1  +  r)C  +  c:  +  G&J. 
Starting  from  an  initial  zero  tariff,  CL  =  FL  and  (A.9)  can  be  expressed  in  terms  of the  notation  of equation 
(6.8)  as 
~~4[.,,~.,]. 
Consider  the  second  and  third  rows  of equation  (A.8),  namely 
Recalling  R  =  1121  -  ~1,  and  eliminating  d6,  yields 
and  hence.  we  obtain 
(A.10) 
(A.11) 
dZ(O)  -  x 
dr 
Next,  letting  t  -  00,  in  (24) 
g  - d.m  +IGL(/R 
dr  dr  2Y’ 
(A.13) 
Noting  the  expression  for  1~  (see  (A.5)),  we  see  that  when  tariffs  are  initially  zero,  that  CL&  =  FLCX  = 
r  -  (121, and  hence 
di  x’r  dk  %  -  =  - 
dr  PI  -  r  ( 02,  -  r)-  = 
dr 
--($-4)$.0. 
The  impact  on  total  welfare.  W,  obtained  by  differentiating  (22b),  is 
(A.14) 
dW  1 di  XGLtK  dI?  -- 
dr=;z-  r-p,  dr 
which  using  (A.13)  may  be  written  as (A.15) 
which  1s equauon  (26)  of  the  text. 
The  overall  welfare  loss  described  by (27)  in  the  general  case  arises  because  of the  distortions  caused  by 
the  pre-existing  tariff.  This  reduces  to  0.  when  T  =  0. 
b.  Increase  in  Investment  Tariff 
Setting  1 =  0  in  (28) 
dZ(O) 
dr’=  X[(l  +  r,q  +  c;  +  G‘f& 
which  analogous  to  (A.lO)  may  be  expressed  as 
d.W)  -= 
dr’ 
-&Ill  +  T(F‘L:  -  c$ 
From  the  second  and  third  rows  of (A.8)  we  obtain 
di 
(021  -  r)- dr’ 
enabling  (A.17)  Co be  rewritten  bs 
dZ(O) 
-G- 






Letting  t  -  co  in  (28)  and  noting  that  with  a  pwexinting  uniform  tariff  GL!K  =  r  -  021  -  ~FLL;“K, 
The  impact  on  total  welfare  k%’  is 
(A.20) 
(A.21) 
which  can  be  reduced  co  (30)  by substitution. 4.  Oufline  of Proofs  oJ Propostiions  3,  4,  5 
These  propositions  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  9  <  7’. 
Proposition  3  can  be  established  as follows.  Starting  from  9  >  0,  (A.lO)  can  be  expressed  as 
d-w  -  = 
dsc  (A.10’) 
Combining  this  equation  with  (A.ll)  and  (A.15),  which  hold  for  arbitrary  ri,  rca  and  using  the  definition  of 
GLlK  =  (r+6)+r-an-rCFLL;  (A.22) 





+  ;rc  (FLLI;  -C+  -  (FLL:  -  C:) 
a22 
From  (A.8)  we  can  show  dI?/drC  >  0,  while  a sufficient  condition  for  the  coefficient  of this  term  in  (A.23)  to 
be  negative  is  that  ri  <  7’.  The  remaining  term  in  (A.23)  can  also  be  shown  to  be  negative,  implying  that 
dW/d+  <  0,  hs stated  in  Proposition  3. 
To  obtain  Propositions  4  and  5,  we  first  derive  the  analogous  welfare  effects  for  ri.  Equations  (A.17), 
(A.18),  and  (A.21)  all  hold  for  arbitrary  predetermined  values  of  the  tariff  rates  ri,  rc.  Combining  these 
relationships,  one  can  establish 
(A.24) 
and  noting  (A.22),  enables  (A.24)  to  be  written  89 
From  (A.8)  we  can  readily  show  dI?/dr’  <  0, while  as before  a sufficient  condition  for  the  term  in  parentheses 
in  (A.25)  to  be  negative  is  that  r’  <  7’.  These  results  together  imply  dW/dr’  >  0. 
To  establish  Proposition  4,  first  write w  = W(rC.  7’) 
the  differential  of which  is 
dW  =  $$dr”  +  $dr’. 
Observe  that  (A.23)  and  (A.25)  are  of the  form 
dW  ,& 





where  7  <  0,  and  for  r’  c  +,  0  <  0.  Thus 
dW  =  9  gdrc  +  sdr’  +  ydrc. 
I-  - 1 
Consider  now  a radial  reduction  in  T’  and  ri  specified  by  di/  ri  =  pdrc/rc.  The  net  effect  on  wealth  is 
(A.26) 
The  reduction  in  the  capital  stock  from  the  lower  tu  on  consumption  goods  is  welfare  improving,  while 
the  higher  capital  stock  resulting  from  the  higher  taw  on  investment  is  welKare  deteriorating.  Using  (A.8), 
equation  (A.26)  becomes 
It  is  easy to  show  that  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  term  in  parentheses  to  be  positive  is  that  p  <  rC(l  + 
r’)/s’(l+  r’).  If this  condition  is met,  a radial  reduction  in  tariffs  is  welfare  improving,  thereby  establishing 
Proposition  4. 
Proposition  5  follows  immediately  by  combining  the  results  of  (A.23)  and  (A.25),  namely  dW/dF  < 
0,dWfdi  >  0. FOOTNOTES 
‘This  paper  has  benefited  from  presentation  LO the  International  IVorkshop,  Columbia  University.  \~‘e 
are  also  pleased  to  acknowledge  the  comments  of the  anonymous  referees. 
‘Neary  and  Ruane  present  their  analysis  in  terms  of  a  vec.tor  of  tariffs,  but  for  expository  reasons  do 
not  emphasize  differentA  tariffs  (see  their  footnote  4).  Our  specification  of differential  tariffs  on  consumer 
and  investment  goods  was  motivated,  in  part,  by  Krueger’s  (1983)  survey  of  protective  trade  policies.  III 
that  survey,  Krueger  (p.  8)  noted  that  the  “emphasis  on  import  substitution  led  to...implicit  subsidiratlon 
of capital  goods  imports.  Although  one  might  think  that  import  substitution  policies  would  be  across  the 
board  in  their  application,  almost  all  countries  with  overvalued  exchange  rates  were  reluctant  to  impose 
surcharges  and  high  duties  on  machinery  and  equipment  imports  for  fear  of discouraging  investment.” 
?Two  of these  reforms  (Korea  and  Chile)  are  discussed  in  Section  VI. 
%a,  e.g.,  Matsuyama  (1987),  Brock  (1988),  Obstfeld  (1989),  Sen  and  ‘Dxnovsky  (1989). 
‘We  could  have  considered  the  three  agent  problem  of the  consumer,  firm,  and  landlord.  However,  the 
analytical  results  are  the  same.  Compactness  of  presentation  of  the  model  convinced  us  to  adopt  the  single 
agent  formulation. 
SThroughout  we  adopt  the  following  conventional  notation.  Partial  derivatives  are  denoted  by corre- 
sponding  letters,  while  total  derivatives  of  a  function  of  a  single  argument  are  denoted  by  primes.  Time 
derivatives  are  denoted  by  dots. 
6R,e.sufts ace  robust  with  respect  to  the  specification  of  the  adjustment  cost  function  6(I,  I<)  and  many 
variants  can  be  found  in  the  literature.  For  further  discussion  of  the  specification  of adjustment  costs  in  the 
investment  process  see  Hayashi  (1982). 
‘These  properties  imply:  $(6K,K)  =  6K,  tj~,(bK,K)  =  1.  Using  Euler’s  theorem,  the  following 
additional  propertiea  of $,  evaluated  at  steady-iltate  equilibrium  are  used  below: 
ti)  tiK(6~,~)  =  0;  (ii)  +r,(6~,~)6  +  $1~(6K,  K)  =  0;  (iii)  4~d6K.K)~  •t  $K~c(~~*~)  =  ’ 
‘The  Corden  discussion  is  carried  out  in  terms  of a  static  framework.  The  assumption  of appropriate 
lump-sum  transfers  in  conjunction  with  distortionary  taxes  is  also  widely  employed  in  intertemporal  public 
finance  models,  such  as Judd  (1987)  and  King  and  Rebelo  (1990). 
%lce  P,C=,f,Lm.  and  Lr  are  functions  of  rc,  but  not  ri,  for  convenience  the  notation  c  refers  to 
&?/arc  etc.  Likewise,  since  I  depends  upon  9  but  not  r  c, I,  refers  to  all&‘.  This  choice  of notation 
should  be  clear. rDWith  the  CES  utility  function  (I,.,,* depends  upon  the  intertemporal  elasticity  of wbstitution  relative 
to  the  intratemporal  elasticity  of substitution;  see  e.g.,  Dornbusch  (1983). 
“The  behavioral  responsea  described  in  (7a)  -  (7f)  are  only  the  compensated  responses  of the  agent  to 
changes  in  either  of the  two  tariff  rates,  since  changed  in  either  rate  will  alter  the  shadow  value  of wealth,  the 
market  price  of capital,  and  cause  the  capital  stock  to  change  over  time.  These  overall  eRecta  are  discusned 
in  the  Appendix. 
‘oThe  fact  that  the  elementa  appearing  in  the  matrix  of coefficients  are  to  be  evaluated  at  steady  state 
permits  substantial  simplification.  (i)  In  general,  86/8q  =  (1  +  ri)d~~,I,  +  (r  +  t5).  Differentiating  (6e) 
implies  I,  =  l/(1  +  r’)$rr.  Then  using  the  steady  state  condition  (ii)  in  footnote  7,  BQ/Bq reduces  to 
r.  (ii)  In  general  &/0X(  =  -(l  +  +)[F  KX  +  FKLL;~]  +  (1  +  rj)[$~~  +  $JKJ~K].  Using  the  lact  that  in 
steady  state  IK  =  6,  and  condition  (iii)  of footnote  7  implies  [$KK  +  $KJIK)  =  0.  (iii)  the  remaining  terma 
8k/Bq,8k/BK  follow  directly  from  (6e)  and  (2). 
13From  the  optima&  condition  with  respect  to  labor  supply  for  the  representative  agent,  the  elasticity 
of labor  supply,  can  be  shown  to  be  related  to  V”  by 
,=22! 
V”  L . 
“There  is  no  general  agreement  on  the  magnitude  of  the  compensated  supply  elasticity  of  labor  in 
developing  countries.  Many  early  models,  such  an  Lewis  (1954)  and  Rani  and  Fei  (1961)  emphasized  the 
existence  of surplw  labor  in  a non  utility-maximizing  framework.  Sen  (1966)  first  showed  that  the  existence 
of surplus  labor  in  a  utility-maximizing  model  impliu  that  the  compensated  (i.e.,  X  constant)  labor  supply 
elasticity  be  infinite.  Consequently,  our  model  treats  labor  supply  elasticities  that  are  bounded  below  by 
the  standard  trade  model  assumption  of  a  zero  supply  elasticity  and  above  by  the  infinitely-elastic  supply 
assumption  of a surplus  labor  economy. 
ISWhen  +  is sufficiently  large,  it  is  possible  for  a  further  increase  to  lead  to  an  immediate  reduction  in 
instantaneous  welfare  (and  continuous  losses  thereafter).  This  may  occur  if dI/d+  >  0. 
‘*These  results  follow  from  consideration  of  the  terma  $11, and  V”  on  the  size  of the  system’s  negative 
eigenvalue: 
where 
1  1  jj’=-t--- 
2  2 \I r’-4(1+7i)$,,  l+”  (FKK+FKLL~?) 
FKK  +  FKLLz  =  {I(1  +  T)FhLGh&  +  v”[(l+  r)F‘L  +  CL‘])  <  O. Equivently  one  can  show  that  I”  the  limiting  case  I/”  =  0.  dI?/dr  =  0 
“dY/dK  >  r+6  if  and  only  if  T  <  -  (“tc;“)  3,  where  q  E  dL/dWF  is  the  elasticity  of  the  supply 
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